Solution: Consider an oligopolistic market with two firms who produce an identical produce. One of the firms has a (constant) marginal cost of production
Question: Consider an oligopolistic market with two firms who produce an identical produce. One of the firms has a (constant) marginal cost of production of $10 unit while the other has a (constant) marginal cost of production of $20.
The demand curve for the market is given by
\[P=100-Q\]Where Q is total output.
- If this market is run as a Bertrand equilibrium, what price will each firm choose?
- If this market is run as a Cartel, what price will be chosen? How will production be divided between the two firms?
- Is this cartel likely to be stable in the absence of a binding agreement?
Repeat (a), (b), and (c) for the following demand curve?
\[P=30-Q\]Explain any differences in your original answers.
Deliverable: Word Document 