(See Steps) Continue to consider this discrete Bertrand model, but now assume that each student has a constant cost of 5 that is deducted from all payoffs.


Question: Continue to consider this discrete Bertrand model, but now assume that each student has a constant cost of 5 that is deducted from all payoffs. So whoever has the low number wins their number, minus 5. Whoever has the high number loses 5 total. In the event of a tie, each student wins an amount equal to their number divided by two, then minus five. Find any Nash equilibria in this game. Explain your reasoning.

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