[Solved] Consider an oligopoly in which the inverse demand function is p(∑limits_i=1^nx_i)=a-b∑limits_i=1^nx_i, a,b>0 and each firm’s cost c(x_i)=cx_i,

Question: Consider an oligopoly in which the inverse demand function is

\[p\left( \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{{{x}_{i}}} \right)=a-b\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}{{{x}_{i}}},\,\,a,b>0\]

and each firm’s cost $c\left( {{x}_{i}} \right)=c{{x}_{i}}$, \(0 n , determine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium output, profit, deviation of price from marginal cost and deadweight loss. Then evaluate the limits of all those as n tends towards infinity. Comment on the significance of your results.

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[Solved] Consider an oligopoly in which the inverse demand function is p(∑limits_i=1^nx_i)=a-b∑limits_i=1^nx_i, a,b>0 and each firm’s cost c(x_i)=cx_i,

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